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Abstract 
Little is known about the aetiology of philosophical intuitions in spite of their central role in 
analytic philosophy. This paper provides a psychological account of the intuitions that 
underlie philosophical practice, with a focus on intuitions that underlie the method of cases. I 
argue that many philosophical intuitions originate from spontaneous, early-developing 
cognitive processes that also play a role in other cognitive domains. Additionally, they have a 
skilled, practiced component. Philosophers are expert elicitors of intuitions in the dialectical 
context of professional philosophy. If this analysis is correct, this should lead to a 
reassessment of experimental philosophical studies of expertise. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Analytic philosophers frequently appeal to intuitions. In the method of cases1, vivid scenarios 
elicit intuitive responses that directly speak for or against a philosophical claim.  
Take, for instance, Lackey’s [2007] case of the creationist teacher. Prima facie, it seems you 
should only assert p if you know that p. To challenge this view, Lackey has us imagine a 
devoutly Christian Young Earth creationist teacher who accepts creationism on the basis of 
faith, but who also recognises the scientific evidence in favour of evolution. When she asserts 
to her class ‘Modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus’, it seems that she is 
warranted in making this assertion, although she does not know or even believe this 
proposition. This intuition provides a strong case against the claim that assertion requires 
knowledge. The epistemic function of intuitions is not restricted to the method of cases, but is 
also prominent in other philosophical styles of argumentation, such as analogies. 
 Until recently, the evidential value of intuitions elicited in the method of cases and 
other philosophical writings was uncontroversial. However, of late a number of philosophers 
have wondered whether intuitions are helpful to adjudicate between philosophical views. 
From the armchair, Cappelen [2012] argues that intuitions do not have any special evidential 
value, and that we should dispense with them altogether. Using empirical methods, negative2 
experimental philosophers have launched a pervasive attack on the purported reliability of 
intuitions: they argue that intuitions are unreliable, because they vary along dimensions that 																																																								
1 The method of cases in analytic philosophy involves the construction of scenarios that elicit 
intuitions. These intuitions are considered as evidence for or against philosophical theories.  
2 Alexander et al. [2014] distinguish between two projects of experimental philosophy: 
positive and negative. Positive experimental philosophers embrace the evidential value of 
intuitions, but insist that empirical methods are needed to probe what intuitions laypeople 
hold. Negative experimental philosophers attack reliance on intuitions by pointing out how 
these vary across different groups, or according to the context and order in which thought 
experiments are presented. 
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are epistemically irrelevant, for instance, language [Vaesen et al. 2013], gender [Buckwalter 
and Stich 2014], culture [Weinberg et al. 2001], and age [Colaço et al. 2014]. 
 Recent attempts to replicate some of these studies, however, have failed to demonstrate 
the purported gender and ethnicity effects [e.g., Adleberg et al. in press; Nagel et al. 2013]. 
For example, Weinberg et al. [2001] found that students at Rutgers who had an East Asian 
background were more likely to attribute knowledge in Gettier cases than students with a 
western background. By contrast, in Kim and Yuan’s [2014] replication, participants of white 
and Asian backgrounds responded in a strikingly similar fashion: 85.4% of East Asians and 
86.2% of Westerners denied knowledge in Gettier cases. This stability in epistemic intuitions 
in replication studies is heartening, but as Nagel [2012] cautions, it would be a mistake to 
equate consensus with correctness. She cites empirical evidence by Koriat [2008] that 
indicates that the strength of an intuition correlates with the consensus that people have about 
it, not necessarily with its correctness. 
 Discussions on philosophical intuitions have seldom considered their psychological 
origins. This paper will examine the psychological origins of intuitions that underlie 
philosophical practice, with a focus on intuitions elicited by the method of cases. Tentatively, 
I will look at some implications of this research for the dependability of those intuitions, but 
my aims are primarily descriptive. As I will argue in section 2, understanding the aetiology of 
philosophical intuitions is vital for making headway in debates on their evidential value. 
Section 3 takes the dual processing approach as a starting point to understand where 
philosophical intuitions come from. While this provides a plausible account for the origins of 
intuitions, it cannot explain how they are used in philosophical practice. Section 4 proposes 
two distinct developmental pathways for intuitions, as maturationally and practiced natural, 
drawing on theoretical work by McCauley [2011]. Section 5 explores the maturationally 
natural origins of philosophical intuitions, focusing on teleological intuitions that underlie the 
argument from design, and epistemic intuitions that underpin scenarios of knowledge 
attribution. Section 6 examines the practiced, skilled elements of philosophical intuitions. 
Philosophical intuitions are to a significant extent the result of type 1 cognitive processes that 
also play a role in other cognitive domains. Philosophers are expert elicitors of intuitions in 
the dialectical context of professional philosophy. If correct, this should lead to a 
reassessment of experimental philosophical studies of expertise. 
 
2. Why the aetiology of philosophical intuitions matters 
 
Historical and contemporary philosophers [e.g., Locke 1690; Brogaard in press] have often 
compared intuitions to perception: 
 
This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces itself 
immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way; 
and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is 
presently filled with the clear light of it. ’Tis on this intuition, that depends all 
the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge [Locke 1690: 264]. 
 
 Beliefs formed on the basis of ordinary perception are often veridical. To explain why, 
we can draw on a wealth of empirical work in the cognitive sciences that elucidates how 
perception leads us to form true beliefs. For this reason, reliabilists frequently cite simple 
cases of perception as exemplar cases of justified belief formation, and when arguing for the 
reliability of a specific belief-forming process (such as mystical perception), they are keen to 
draw analogies with ordinary sense perception [e.g., Alston 1991]. However, this strategy 
does not extend to domains like logic, mathematics, and ethics [Schechter 2013]. Beliefs in 
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these fields suffer from the access problem: it is not obvious how we have access to the 
relevant logical, mathematical, or ethical truths. An influential formulation of the access 
problem is Benacerraf’s [1973] challenge to mathematical Platonism. Assuming that 
knowledge depends on a causal relationship between knower and object, it is hard to see how 
we can know that 2 + 2 = 4 if numbers are Platonic, acausal entities outside of space-time. 
Field [1989: 232–233] later generalised this challenge: ‘we should view with suspicion any 
claim to know facts about a certain domain if we believe it impossible in principle to explain 
the reliability of our beliefs about that domain.’ Formulated in this way, the access problem is 
not specific to Platonism. It generalises to any domain where the purported reliability of the 
beliefs in this domain is not readily explicable. 
 If we have no aetiological account of philosophical intuitions that ties them somehow to 
philosophical truths, we have no compelling reason to accept that such intuitions are sound. 
In Cummins’ [1998] terminology, we have no way to externally calibrate philosophical 
intuitions, that is, to assess their validity apart from their perceived consensus in the 
philosophical community. By contrast, scientific procedures, such as the use of a telescope, 
can be externally calibrated because we have access to the target independent of the 
procedure we are testing. Cummins argues that we do not have a ‘test key’ that allows us to 
assess whether intuitions about fairness and other properties that philosophers study are 
warranted. Consensus about the validity of philosophical intuitions, even if universal, is 
insufficient. Suppose everyone saw the same thing through their telescope—without an 
external way to assess whether telescopes are reliable instruments that is not enough to 
establish the validity of the practice. 
 There is an established tradition in western philosophy to look for psychological origins 
of intuitions as an external way to justify appeal to those intuitions. Examples include 
anamnesis in Plato, noûs in Aristotle, and innate ideas in the rationalist tradition. Gradually, 
philosophers have discarded these notions, and by the eighteenth century, intuition had 
become roughly synonymous with immediate knowledge. As a result, contemporary 
philosophers frequently appeal to intuitions without having a theoretical rationale for this 
practice. As Hintikka [1999: 131] puts it, ‘The vast majority of philosophical writers these 
days take the name ‘intuition’ in vain since they do not believe in Platonic anamnesis, 
Aristotelian forms, Cartesian innate ideas, or Kantian transcendental deductions.’ 
 In the absence of these concepts, where could an external measure be found to gauge 
philosophical intuitions? Until recently, intuitions received little attention in psychology. The 
exception was intuitions in linguistics, the spontaneous judgments by which native speakers 
assess whether sentences are grammatical. However, over the past 15 years, intuitions have 
become more prominent, especially in dual processing models of reasoning (see next section), 
and in the study of moral intuitions [e.g., Haidt 2001]. Psychologists do not use the term 
intuition in the same way as philosophers do, but there is a large semantic overlap [see 
Hodgkinson et al. 2008 for review]. In both disciplines, intuitions are regarded as 
assessments that come about without explicit reasoning and that seem to have some prima 
facie credibility to those who hold them. For example, Gopnik and Schwitzgebel [1998: 77], 
a psychologist and a philosopher, define intuitive judgments as ‘not made on the basis of 
some kind of explicit reasoning process that a person can consciously observe. Intuitions are 
judgments that grow, rather, out of an underground process, of whatever kind, that cannot be 
directly observed.’ Moreover, in both disciplines, there is an on-going debate on the 
epistemic value of intuitions. For instance, psychologists examine whether reliance on 
intuition can help improve managerial decisions [Sinclair and Ashkanasy 2005]. 
 Psychological investigations of intuitions can potentially provide us with resources to 
gauge the evidential value of intuitions deployed in philosophical practice. Within a 
naturalistic framework, there is a fundamental continuity between philosophical reasons and 
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psychological causes. Intuitions and other products of philosophical reflection do not stand 
outside the natural order [see Blackburn 2001 for discussion]. In this view, the psychological 
underpinnings of intuitions can provide a test key to assess their validity. Reliabilism, while 
not the only way to bridge naturalistic causes with philosophical motivations, is one of the 
best-developed frameworks to link them. In this framework, a test key to probe the soundness 
of philosophical intuitions is the extent to which cognitive processes that underlie our 
formation of philosophical intuitions are reliable. Appealing to the psychological origins of 
philosophical intuitions is, of course, also a philosophical move. It is not external to 
philosophical discourse. However, it is independent from the philosophical practices that are 
typically used to elicit intuitions, such as introspection; in this way, it provides an 
independent way to assess the reliability of philosophical intuitions. The next section will 
examine dual processing accounts as a potential way to characterise philosophical intuitions 
in psychological terms. 
 
3. Intuitions as a result of Type 1 cognitive processes 
 
‘Intuitive’ and ‘intuition’ characterise widely divergent activities, events, and objects. The 
controls of a computer game, a melody, and a style of playing chess can be described as 
intuitive [Cappelen 2012: chapter 2]. Because of the disparate contexts in which these terms 
are used, Cappelen is pessimistic about the prospects for a unifying definition. However, he 
observes ‘one feature that stands out when these cases are considered: there is some kind of 
ease, effortlessness, or spontaneity involved. Another way of putting this is that the acts 
involved don’t require a lot of reflection or effort’ [Cappelen 2012: 33, emphasis in original]. 
The distinction between fluent and effortful cognitive processes lies at the heart of dual 
processing accounts of reasoning. Dual processing accounts can help to uncover the 
psychological underpinnings of philosophical intuitions [see also Nagel 2014]. 
 Dual processing accounts propose that human cognition is characterised by two types 
of processes. These are termed Type 1 and Type 2, also known as System 1 and System 2 
[Evans 2008; Stanovich and West 2000]3. Type 1 cognition is typically fast, automatic, fluent, 
and effortless. It is implicit, context-sensitive, and personalised. Its outputs emerge 
spontaneously, without explicit inference or reasoning. For example, when I drop a pen, I 
form the spontaneous belief that the pen will fall downward. This belief does not require an 
inference from other beliefs (e.g., The Earth exerts gravitational pull to objects with mass in 
its proximity; This pen is an object with mass in the proximity of the Earth; Therefore, if 
released, it will fall toward the centre of the planet). Intuitions are typical outputs of Type 1 
cognition. Type 2 cognition is slower, less fluent, deliberate, and effortful. It requires making 
explicit inferences. It is less susceptible to context and to some extent depersonalised. For 
instance, assessing that the conclusion ‘Cigarettes are healthy’ is correct, given the premises, 
‘All plant-based items are healthy; Cigarettes are plant-based’ requires the ability to disregard 
knowledge one has acquired earlier and to focus on the validity of the conclusion. Arguments 
are typical outputs of Type 2 cognition. 
 Developmental psychologists [e.g., Spelke and Kinzler 2007; Carey and Spelke 1996] 
locate the origin of some Type 1 cognitive processes in core cognition, representations that 
children acquire early in development, often in infancy. These provide humans with a rich set 
of intuitions in several domains. An example is intuitive physics, which yields intuitions 																																																								3	I will use the Type terminology, as the Systems terminology gives the impression that the 
two types of thinking form two coherent separate systems. Current empirical evidence 
indicates that there are several cognitive processes, working in parallel, which can be 
characterised as either intuitive or reflective.	
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about the behaviour of inanimate objects, e.g., they persist when not in sight, and their 
motion is influenced by external agents and objects. Spelke et al. [1995] found that even 
three-month-olds have expectations about objects; for instance, they are surprised (indicated 
by a longer looking time) if a solid object falls apart without any apparent external cause. 
Other domains of core cognition include intuitive psychology, by which we attribute beliefs, 
desires, and other mental states to others, and intuitive biology, by which we attribute 
biological functions such as eating, sleeping, and growth to biological organisms. Some 
authors, such as Carey [2009], draw a further distinction between core cognition and folk 
theories (also known as intuitive theories), which are more culturally variable and build on 
core cognition. For instance, human core cognition allows us to distinguish small 
cardinalities up to 3 precisely, and larger numbers approximately. Combined with language 
and counting strategies, young children learn to represent natural numbers, for instance, they 
learn that 2 + 2 = 4. Although they emerge somewhat later in development than core 
cognition (typically in middle childhood), folk theories are a form of Type 1 cognition, as 
they are fluent, effortless, and context-sensitive. Folk psychology, for example, is cross-
culturally variable in the extent to which we attribute people’s actions to internal motivations 
or external circumstance [Lillard 1988], but these attributions happen spontaneously and 
unreflectively.  
 Under many circumstances, Type 1 cognition provides humans, as well as other 
animals, with knowledge about their environment4. However, Type 1 cognition is highly 
susceptible to biases and faulty heuristics. For example, intuitive physics yields predictions 
that deviate from Newtonian physics. Laypeople have difficulties predicting the trajectory of 
objects: they believe that a ball launched from a sling will continue in a spiral trajectory, or 
that a ball dropped by a running person will fall straight to the ground, rather than following a 
parabolic path [McCloskey et al. 1983]. Take, as another example, the cognitive reflection 
task [Frederick 2005], a simple three-item test that requires participants to suppress Type 1 
responses to provide the correct answer, for example, 
 
A ball and a bat cost $ 1.10. The bat costs $ 1 more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost? 
 
In order to provide the correct, reflective answer (5 cents), participants need to actively resist 
giving the intuitive answer (10 cents). Can we conclude from this that Type 1 cognition is 
unreliable? Not necessarily, since experiments like these are set up in such a way that the 
intuitive response is incorrect, and that the Type 2, reflective response, is correct. The 
normative expectation that reasoning is superior to intuition is already built into the 
experiment [Elqayam and Evans 2011: 245]. A meta-analysis of studies that compare the 
strengths and weaknesses of both types of thinking found no overall advantage for Type 1 or 
Type 2 cognitive processing [Acker 2008]: whether making deliberate inferences or relying 
on intuition is best depends on the situation. For instance, people are better at detecting 
deception when they rely on intuition than when they have to consciously deliberate 
[Albrechtsen et al. 2009]. Type 1 cognition tends to be reliable if it takes place in a relevant 
ecological context and if the cognitive processes are appropriate for the domain. Intuitive 
psychology provides intuitions about whether someone is deceiving us, which is unsurprising 
given the ecological relevance of this capacity for social creatures like us. 
 
4. Two developmental pathways to intuitions 																																																								4	In a psychological sense, knowledge means a body of information an organism can draw on 
to act adaptively in its environment.	
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We have seen that intuitions plausibly originate from Type 1 cognitive processes. 
Discussions of the psychological underpinnings of intuitions do not differentiate between two 
developmental pathways by which intuitions can emerge. Consider the intuition of a native 
speaker about whether a sentence is grammatically correct, and the intuition of a 
mathematician about whether a theorem is provable. Both arise without effort or conscious 
deliberation, and both are fluent and automatic. However, the first kind of intuition results 
from a broadly-shared cognitive process (natural language), whereas the second only occurs 
in mathematical experts. This latter intuition reaches beyond core cognition and other early-
developed Type 1 cognitive processes, although it shares their fluency. 
 To tease apart these two developmental trajectories of intuitive thinking, McCauley 
[2011] distinguishes between two kinds of Type 1 cognitive processes, which he dubs 
maturational and practiced natural. Maturationally natural cognition, such as speaking a 
natural language or intuitive psychology, arises early in development, typically in infancy or 
early childhood. It is mastered without extensive cultural support, emerging through mundane 
interactions between a child and her social and physical environment, as part of species-
typical development. As maturationally natural skills are part of the normal development of 
neurotypical children, there is low variability in their proficiency. While speakers of a natural 
language exhibit some variability in how well they speak the language, within everyday 
discourse there are no experts. Domains of core cognition are maturationally natural. In spite 
of its phenomenological sense of fluency, the cognitive machinery underlying maturationally 
natural cognition can be complex. For instance, belief-desire psychology requires one to keep 
in mind the mental states of others, separate them from one’s own mental states, and update 
them with contextual cues. Yet mental state attribution is a remarkably automatic form of 
processing; even infants as young as seven months are sensitive to the mental states of others 
[Kovács et al. 2010]. Maturationally natural cognition gives rise to intuitions, such as when 
we intuit someone’s motivations and desires based on their behaviour, facial expression, and 
other social cues. 
 Practiced natural cognition, such as reading, writing, cycling, and playing the guitar, 
does not emerge spontaneously. Typically, these skills require some material scaffolding, 
such as instruction manuals or trainer wheels. Many hours of dedicated, deliberate practice 
are required to become proficient in a practiced natural skill. As a result, most practitioners 
do not reach the level of experts in their field, but remain at a lower level of proficiency (e.g., 
few guitarists exhibit the skill of Jimi Hendrix). This gives rise to substantial variability in 
competence. High levels of expertise in a practiced natural skill are associated with structural 
changes in the brain. For example, musicians who learned to play a musical instrument 
during childhood exhibit increases in grey matter in motor, auditory, and visual-spatial brain 
areas [Gaser and Schlaug 2003]. Practiced natural cognition generates intuitions, for instance, 
musicians have intuitions about how a piece of music will continue [Huron 2006]. Practiced 
natural skills typically recruit some maturationally natural capacities. For example, there is 
growing evidence that formal arithmetic builds on an evolved number sense, which helps us 
to discriminate between discrete magnitudes in our environment [Lourenco et al. 2012]. 
Being able to improvise or predict the direction of a musical piece is a practiced skill that 
requires extensive training and listening, but musical scales, tempos, and harmonies build on 
evolved acoustic preferences that were shaped by human evolution, in particular, speech 
comprehension [Gill and Purves 2009]. 
 Applying the distinction between maturationally and practiced natural cognition, I 
suggest that philosophical intuitions have a dual developmental origin. In section 5, I propose 
that many philosophical intuitions, especially those used in the method of cases, are elicited 
by maturationally natural cognitive processes, such as intuitive psychology and intuitive 
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physics. In section 6, I argue that philosophical training gives rise to practiced natural 
intuitions about specific philosophical positions. The deployment of scenarios, analogies, and 
other writings that elicit maturational intuitions in a dialectical context is also practiced 
natural. 
 
5. Maturationally natural roots of philosophical intuitions 
 
As we have seen, maturationally natural intuitions originate from several domains of core 
cognition such as intuitive psychology, intuitive biology, and intuitive physics. Goldman 
[2007: 11] hypothesises that it is ‘unlikely that there is a single psychological faculty 
responsible for all intellectual insight. The psychological pathways that lead to mathematical, 
logical, and application intuitions [intuitions elicited in the method of cases] respectively are 
probably quite different.’ If philosophical intuitions have distinct causal origins, this 
‘undercuts the notion that rational intuitions are homogeneous in their reliability’ [Goldman 
2007: 11], for instance, intuitions in arithmetic might be reliable, whereas philosophical 
intuitions might not be. 
 The situation is likely more complex than Goldman envisages: several maturationally 
natural cognitive processes underlie the generation of philosophical intuitions. For example, 
intuitions about what counts as knowledge may be shaped by intuitive psychology, our 
maturationally natural ability to attribute knowledge and beliefs to others (see 5.2). By 
contrast, modal intuitions about the identity of objects across possible worlds may be shaped 
by psychological essentialism [Mizrahi 2014]. This is the tendency to attribute essences to 
objects which allows young children and adults to ignore superficial, external characteristics 
when they think about the identity of objects. For example, three-year-olds realise that an 
apple seed, planted in a pear orchard, will turn into an apple tree [Gelman and Wellman 
1991]. 
 I will now examine two cases, teleological intuitions in natural theology and epistemic 
intuitions in the attribution of knowledge, as examples of maturationally natural cognition 
that underlie the generation of philosophical intuitions. While my focus is primarily 
descriptive, a study of the psychological origins can also reveal something about their 
validity. If it is the case that there are diverse psychological processes that underlie the 
generation of intuitions in philosophy, we can expect that they are not valid or invalid across 
the board. Rather, their evidential value should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Such 
assessments should look at the mechanisms that underlie the generation of philosophical 
intuitions, and at the philosophical context in which they are deployed. For example, suppose 
that intuitions that lead us to deny knowledge in Gettier cases are shaped by folk psychology. 
To assess whether these intuitions are correct, we should first examine whether the folk 
psychological mechanisms underlying them generally produce reliable results, i.e., whether 
humans can reliably attribute or deny knowledge in everyday situations. Next, we should see 
whether these folk psychological mechanisms function well in the context of Gettier 
scenarios, which are complex and place demands on working memory due to the unexpected 
coming together of several events. If both conditions are met, we have an external, 
psychological validation for the appeal to epistemic intuitions in Gettier cases.  
 
5.1 Teleological intuitions and the design argument 
Design arguments in natural theology have an enduring popularity across times and cultures, 
appearing in ancient Greece and Rome, as well as medieval Europe, India, and the Islamic 
world [see e.g., Sedley 2007, Brown 2012]. Drawing an analogy between natural objects like 
the eye and intricate artefacts like a watch, they propose that the best explanation for ordered 
complexity and teleology in nature is a designer, arguing that purely naturalistic causes 
Where	philosophical	intuitions	come	from	
	 8	
cannot bring these features into existence. For instance, Cicero [45 BCE (1967)] derided the 
atomists for thinking that mere fortuitous collisions of particles could bring about the beauty 
and complexity of the world. Paley [1802 (2006)] rejected naturalistic accounts as 
insufficient explanations for complex design features of the natural world. Design arguments 
rely on two maturationally natural intuitions: ordered complexity is caused by agents, and the 
natural world exhibits teleology [see also De Cruz and De Smedt in press: chapter 4]. 
 Developmental psychological research supports an early-developed propensity of 
young children to infer agents as the causes of order, complexity, and goal-directedness. 
Preverbal infants seem to intuit that only agents can create order: they exhibit surprise (as 
measured by a longer looking time) when they see that the cause of an ordered state of affairs, 
such as a neat stack of blocks or a recurrent pattern of beads, is caused by a mechanical tool. 
They do not show surprise when the cause turns out to be a human hand [Ma and Xu 2013]. 
Preschoolers who are asked whether an agent (e.g., mom) or a non-agent (e.g., the wind) can 
cause a room to become messy or tidy assert that both agents and non-agents can make it 
messy, but that only an agent can tidy it up [Newman et al. 2010]. 
 The intuition that the world exhibits teleology emerges around age 4 or 5. Preschoolers 
have a strong preference for teleological explanations (e.g., mountains are there for climbing) 
over non-teleological, mechanistic accounts (e.g., mountains are there because a lot of stuff 
piled up). They also spontaneously formulate teleological explanations for natural kinds and 
animals, e.g., lions are there ‘to go in the zoo’ [Kelemen 2004]. In concurrence with this, 
children from religious and non-religious backgrounds prefer creationist accounts of the 
origin of species. This tendency only lessens when they become teenagers, when children 
from secular backgrounds start to give more evolutionary explanations [Evans 2001]. 
Although teleological thinking lessens during adolescence, it is never completely 
eradicated—several studies indicate that our intuitive preference for teleology remains latent. 
For example, when adults are put under time pressure and have to decide quickly whether 
explanations are true or false, they are more likely to label incorrect teleological explanations 
as true, e.g., ‘The sun radiates heat to nurture life on earth’ [Kelemen and Rosset 2009]. 
Strikingly, even Ivy League physical scientists show an increased tendency for teleological 
thinking when put under time pressure, for instance, they are likely to endorse explanations 
like ‘mosses form around rocks to stop soil erosion’ [Kelemen et al. 2013]. As they predicted, 
Kelemen et al. [2013] found that teleological spurious reasoning is lower among physical 
scientists compared to the general population, but to their surprise, a PhD in the humanities 
also has a protective effect. Education decreases the tendency to infer teleology: Romani 
adults who are schooled reason less teleologically than those without schooling [Casler and 
Kelemen 2008]. People with Alzheimer’s show a re-emerging tendency to endorse incorrect 
teleological explanations, probably a result of their inability to recall the mechanistic 
explanations they learned earlier in life [Lombrozo et al. 2007].  
 Notice that in this work on teleology, the tendency to offer the intuitive, Type 1 
response (which is to give a teleological explanation) is measured by the extent to which 
respondents provide incorrect answers. One cannot infer from this literature that teleological 
intuitions in general are spurious. Nevertheless, the well-attested tendency for false positives 
in this domain does give some cause for concern for the cogency of intuitions that underlie 
the design argument. The propensity to infer teleology, and by extension, design, lessens 
when people are under better epistemic conditions, e.g., education decreases teleology, time 
pressure and Alzheimer’s increase it. 
 
5.2 Epistemic intuitions and knowledge attribution 
In several papers Jennifer Nagel [e.g., Nagel 2012; Nagel et al. 2013; Boyd and Nagel 2014] 
advocates the reliability of epistemic intuitions. She argues that intuitions elicited by Gettier, 
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Truetemp, and fake barn cases are underpinned by intuitive psychology. On the basis of 
evolutionary considerations, she proposes that epistemic intuitions are vital to make accurate 
mental state attributions. Humans are a social species; successful interactions with 
conspecifics require that one is good at surmising what others think. 
 Boyd and Nagel [2014: 111] speculate that epistemic intuitions arise because it is 
‘valuable for creatures like us to form rapid impressions about the presence or absence of 
knowledge.’ They invoke the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis, which states that 
animals living in complex social groups gain competitive advantages by accurately 
attributing mental states, and by discerning good or bad intentions, including deliberate 
deception. However, they acknowledge that mental state attribution takes place in 
cooperative settings as well. One context they do not explore, but that is ecologically 
important, is the extensive reliance on testimony. As children depend heavily on testimony 
from their parents and other informants, it is unsurprising that they are sensitive to the mental 
states of their interlocutors. For example, four-year-olds prefer informants who are 
knowledgeable to those who are accurate but who have to rely on third parties to get the 
answer [Einav and Robinson 2011]. However, because young children typically learn from 
benevolent testifiers, they are better at detecting ignorance than deliberate deception. For 
example, three-year-olds tend to trust an adult who deliberately misled them in the past 
[Jaswal et al. 2010]. 
 Nagel’s argument does not take into account that an optimal knowledge-attribution 
psychology might deviate from truth due to asymmetries in the costs and benefits of false 
positives (mistakenly attributing true beliefs) and false negatives (failing to attribute true 
beliefs). This may give rise to belief-forming mechanisms that are geared toward 
overattributing true beliefs or belief-forming mechanisms that are too stringent, i.e., 
underattributing true beliefs [see Stephens 2001]. The reliability of epistemic intuitions 
would thus depend on the type of environment they are deployed in. If humans have to 
navigate an epistemically hostile environment, where informants routinely are ignorant or 
deceptive, it may be better to err on the side of safety rather than be deceived by false 
information. By contrast, if one is surrounded by benevolent epistemic superiors (like one’s 
parents and teachers), it makes sense to be generous in attributing true beliefs. If there are 
asymmetries, this might lead to excesses of false positives or negatives in attributing beliefs 
or knowledge. It is at present unclear to what extent epistemic intuitions elicited by 
philosophical cases like fake barn are susceptible to such asymmetries. 
 Nagel relies on Sperber et al.’s [2010] model of epistemic vigilance to argue that 
humans are good at attributing beliefs and knowledge, because they have to maximise the 
benefits of information transmission while minimising the risks of being misinformed. This 
model of folk epistemology sees filtering out deception as the primary role of knowledge 
attribution. As Sterelny [2012] points out, this might be too Machiavellian. The literature on 
epistemic vigilance has been dominated by concerns about deceptive manipulation. But the 
risk of being deceived is not uniform. Children learning from parents may at times be 
deceived (e.g., about Santa), but the skills and knowledge they learn about their environment 
probably accurately reflect what parents know, e.g., washing hands as a way to get rid of 
bacteria. In line with this observation, children are more trusting of their informants than 
adults. They do not trust indiscriminately, as they are sensitive to factors like earlier accuracy 
and consensus, but they are more willing than adults to accept information that goes beyond 
the evidence they already possess [Harris and Corriveau 2011]. 
 This leads to the prediction that younger people, especially children, should be more 
willing to attribute knowledge than older individuals as they have more to gain and less to 
lose from testimony. Several experimental studies back up this claim. Preschoolers trust 
testimony even from previously unreliable informers [see Heynman 2014 for review], and 
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three-year-olds tend to accord more weight to the testimony of adults than to their own 
perceptually-based beliefs [Jaswal et al. 2010]. In agreement with this, Colaço et al. [2014] 
found that older participants are less likely to attribute knowledge in fake barn cases. 
However, as all participants in the latter study are adults (the cutoff age between older and 
younger was 30), it is unlikely that this is due to the benefits of generous knowledge 
attribution in younger persons. Indeed, two attempted replications, one by John Turri, the 
other by Joshua Knobe, could not confirm this age effect5. Ideally, one should conduct 
experimental studies on knowledge attribution in philosophical cases with young children, 
teenagers, and adults to establish a possible age effect. 
 
6. Practiced natural philosophical intuitions 
 
The previous sections have shown how philosophical intuitions in diverse domains draw on 
maturationally natural cognition. In this section, I will examine what distinguishes 
philosophical intuitions, especially as used in the method of cases, from everyday 
maturationally natural intuitions. I will argue that the overlap in psychological terms between 
both types of intuitions is substantial, but that intuitions used in philosophical contexts have 
an additional practiced natural element: philosophers are skilled at eliciting intuitions in a 
dialectical context to evaluate the plausibility of philosophical hypotheses. Moreover, some 
intuitions are the result of philosophical training rather than early-developing maturationally 
natural cognitive processes.  
 That philosophers are expert intuiters seems prima facie plausible, but it has been 
surprisingly hard to pin down what this expertise consists of. Tobia et al. [2013] found that 
philosophers, like laypeople, were influenced in their moral judgments based on whether they 
had to imagine themselves as actors or as observers in moral dilemmas. Remarkably, this 
framing effect was opposite for philosophers and non-philosophers. The former were more 
likely to judge that pulling the switch in a trolley dilemma was obligatory if they imagined 
themselves as actors rather than observers, whereas the latter showed the opposite pattern. 
Schwitzgebel and Cushman [2012] found that philosophers are as susceptible to order effects 
as non-philosophers, and that specialization in moral philosophy does not make a difference. 
In one of their experiments, both philosophers and non-philosophers were more likely to rate 
two versions of the trolley problem equivalently when pushing someone off a bridge to stop a 
trolley from killing five people tied to the tracks was presented before pulling a switch for the 
same reason. Remarkably, philosophers were significantly more sensitive to order effects 
than laypeople. They were more likely to endorse the principle of moral luck when presented 
with cases of bad luck first than if cases of good luck came first, and more likely to endorse 
the doctrine of double effect if switch was presented before push6. As Schwitzgebel and 
Cushman write, the fact that philosophers show such large effects is surprising:  
 
the joint effect of the order of presentation of the moral luck and double effect 																																																								5 	See http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/xphi/2014/06/more-on-fake-barn-intuitions-
replications-of-colaco-et-al.html.	6	Endorsement of the doctrine of double effect was tested as follows [Schwitzgebel and 
Cushman 2012: 139]: ‘Sometimes it is necessary to use one person’s death as a means to 
saving several more people—killing one helps you accomplish the goal of saving several. 
Other times one person’s death is a side-effect of saving several more people—the goal of 
saving several unavoidably ends up killing one as a consequence. Is the first morally better, 
worse, or the same as the second?’ A ‘morally worse’ response was counted as an 
endorsement of the doctrine.	
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cases was to shift philosophers’ rates of endorsement of the doctrine of double 
effect from 28% to 70%, including 28% to 62% for ethics PhDs—a very large 
change considering how familiar and widely discussed the doctrine is within 
professional philosophy. [Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012: 149] 
 
 There is something puzzling about the idea that philosophical expertise should be 
measured by how context-insensitive philosophical intuitions are. Expert skills are typically 
context-sensitive, for instance, an Olympic gymnast takes into account the height and feel of 
the beam she performs a routine on. As Fridland [2014: 2730] observes, experts’ expertise is 
demonstrated in ‘their ability to implement their goals in the nuanced, particular controlled 
ways in which they are able to implement them in the various circumstances in which they 
perform.’ What distinguishes an expert archer from an amateur is the ability to take into 
account wind direction and other environmental conditions. The expert toxophilite keeps a 
low point of gravity and waits for a lull in the wind to take aim. Skilled expertise is a 
thoroughly situated endeavour. This embodied context-sensitivity is not only the case for 
motor skills, but also for more intellectual skills, such as the perception of musical pitch. 
Until recently, it was assumed that people with absolute pitch store particular pitches (e.g., 
A=440 hertz) in long-term memory early on, and that they do not update these pitch 
memories. However, Hedger et al. [2013] found that participants with perfect pitch, who 
were exposed to a musical piece where the tuning was very gradually tweaked to end up 33 
cents off the original A=440 hertz tuning, perceived flat notes as in tune. This suggests that 
people with perfect pitch in fact continuously update their pitch memories by what they hear. 
This updating and sensitivity to the environment is a vital part of their expertise. (Indeed, an 
acquaintance with perfect pitch who plays historical instruments can easily adapt to various 
other historical tunings that deviate from the now-standard A=440 hertz by listening to the 
historical pitches.) 
 If philosophers are guided by the spontaneous, maturationally natural intuitions elicited 
by thought experiments, it is unsurprising that they remain sensitive to the situations vividly 
fleshed out in the method of cases—in some cases even more than laypeople. If philosophers 
remained thoroughly unmoved by the cases they explore, the epistemic value of the method 
would be low. Indeed, the fact that even philosophers, who presumably prior to Schwitzgebel 
and Cushman’s experiments had some opinion about the doctrine of double effect, were 
influenced by the order in which scenarios were presented, highlights the context-sensitivity 
and continued epistemic role of intuitions for individual philosophers, even after they form 
(tentative) opinions about the views the cases are probing. 
 While context-sensitivity characterises skilled expertise, it is not by itself a sufficient 
measure of it. After all, laypeople are also sensitive to the contexts in which their intuitions 
are elicited. Control and flexibility are two other features of expertise, which have not yet 
been investigated by experimental philosophers: skilled practitioners are usually better able at 
controlling their performance in given situations than laypeople, and they can do so more 
flexibly, responding to a greater range of conditions [Fridland 2014]. Trained philosophers 
know what moves are readily available in domains like Aristotelian metaphysics or Kantian 
ethics. A Hume scholar may have intuitions about what Hume would have thought about a 
given topic, even if she does not recall exactly what he wrote about it. Unlike non-experts, 
she would be able to formulate what responses are available to Hume if he were presented 
with an objection to a claim he made. Such intuitions are similar to the practiced natural 
intuitions of expert musicians, who, for example, know what kinds of harmonic structures are 
permissible while making improvisations on a Baroque piece. Because Hume scholars (and 
Baroque musicians) receive similar training, they end up with similar intuitions. There are 
thus two distinct developmental pathways that lead to the fact that philosophical intuitions are 
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broadly shared among philosophers: maturationally natural philosophical intuitions are 
shared because the systems that generate them are strongly canalised in development; 
practiced natural philosophical intuitions are shared because of similarities in the way 
philosophers are trained.  
 Experimental philosophers have focused their investigations of philosophical expertise 
on maturationally natural intuitions that philosophers share with laypeople, but have not yet 
examined the practiced natural intuitions that result from familiarity with philosophical 
positions. This makes methodological sense, given that non-philosophers will have few, if 
any, intuitions about what historical philosophers may have written. However, this focus on 
maturationally natural intuitions has led to an underappreciation of intuitions that are elicited 
in forms of philosophical practice other than the method of cases. Nagel [2014] argues that 
the phrase ‘intuitively’ is used in a dialectical context to flag claims that the intuiter believes 
will be shared with others. In this way, the intuiter hopes that the philosophical claims she 
makes will be accepted on the basis of shared intellectual seemings. The way in which such 
intuitions are deployed in a dialectical context is practiced natural: philosophers are experts in 
designing scenarios, analogies, and other intuition-eliciting writings that speak directly to a 
philosophical claim. 
 In a dialectical context, philosophers elicit intuitions they expect to be shared with 
others, either because they are the result of early-developing maturationally natural cognitive 
processes, or because they flow from practiced natural fluency acquired through 
philosophical training. In both cases, shared intuitive responses have dialectical value. To 
give a concrete example, developmental psychologists [e.g., Bloom 2004] propose that 
humans are intuitive dualists: they make an intuitive distinction between mental and physical 
properties of persons, relying on intuitive psychology and intuitive biology respectively. As a 
result, we can easily imagine that mental states can continue independently from physical 
states, for instance, when attributing mental states to the dead (e.g., ‘grandpa would never 
have agreed to this’). In philosophical thought experiments such as Avicenna’s (Ibn Sina, d. 
1037) flying man, this maturationally natural intuitive dualism is deployed to reach non-
obvious philosophical results: imagine that an adult man is created, suspended in mid air, 
deprived of sensory input and without proprioception. What would this man be aware of? 
According to Avicenna, he would still be aware of himself. As this awareness cannot be of 
his body, it must be that this awareness of himself is of something non-physical, i.e., his 
rational soul. In this thought experiment, Avicenna used the intuitions elicited by 
maturationally natural intuitive dualism to argue against atomist, materialist concepts of the 
soul which were influential in Islamic philosophy at the time [Marmura 1986]. He was 
confident that readers would share this intuition: once one affirms that someone could be 
self-conscious without bodily awareness, one should accept the existence of the immaterial 
soul. Avicenna appealed to broadly-shared maturational intuitions; the practiced natural skill 
is exhibited by his ability to come up with an unusual situation where these intuitions are 
used to argue for a specific philosophical position. It is the dialectical context of discussions 
about the substance of the soul in Islamic philosophy that brings this practiced natural skill to 
the fore. 
 In conclusion, philosophers devise vivid cases and other writings that elicit 
maturationally natural intuitions in a variety of domains. Since these intuitions result from 
early-developed, stable cognitive capacities, we can expect a relatively high degree of 
consensus about them between laypeople and philosophers. Philosophers may not be expert 
intuiters per se, but expert elicitors of such intuitions in dialectical contexts7. 																																																								7	Thanks to Joshua Shepherd for his response to this paper at the Philosophy of Mind work-in-progress seminar 
at Oxford, and to Jennifer Nagel and Johan De Smedt for their comments on an earlier draft. I also like to thank 
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